Here are the slides of my keynote at last week's excellent EUCog meeting: Social and Ethical Aspects of Cognitive Systems. And the talk itself is here, on YouTube.
I've been talking about robot ethics for several years now, but that's mostly been about how we roboticists must be responsible and mindful of the societal impact of our creations. Two years ago I wrote - in my Very Short Introduction to Robotics - that robots cannot be ethical. Since then I've completely changed my mind*. I now think there is a way of making a robot that is at least minimally ethical. It's a huge technical challenge which, in turn, raises new ethical questions. For instance: if we can build ethical robots, should we? Must we..? Would we have an ethical duty to do so? After all, the alternative would be to build amoral robots. Or, would building ethical robots create a new set of ethical problems? An ethical Pandora's box.
The talk was in three parts.
Part 1: here I outline why and how roboticists must be ethical. This is essentially a recap of previous talks. I start with the societal context: the frustrating reality that even when we meet to discuss robot ethics this can be misinterpreted as scientists fear a revolt of killer robots. This kind of media reaction is just one part of three linked expectation gaps, in what I characterise as a crisis of expectations. I then outline a few ethical problems in robotics - just as examples. Here I argue it's important to link safe and ethical behaviour - something that I return to later. Then I recap the five draft principles of robotics.
Part 2: here I ask the question: what if we could make ethical robots? I outline new thinking which brings together the idea of robots with internal models, with Dennett's Tower of Generate and Test, as a way of making robots that can predict the consequences of their own actions. I then outline a generic control architecture for robot safety, even in unpredictable environments. The important thing about this approach is that the robot can generate next possible actions, test them in its internal model, and evaluate the safety consequences of each possible action. The unsafe actions are then inhibited - and the robot controller determines which of the remaining safe actions is chosen, using its usual action-selection mechanism. Then I argue that it is surprisingly easy to extend this architecture for ethical behaviour, to allow the robot to predict the robot actions that would minimise harm for a human in its environment. This appears to represent an implementation of Asimov's 1st and 3rd laws. I outline the significant technical challenges that would need to be overcome to make this work.
But, assuming such a robot could be built, how ethical would it be? I suggest that with a subset of Asimovian ethics it probably wouldn't satisfy an ethicist or moral philosopher. But, nevertheless - I argue there's a good chance that such a minimally ethical robot could help to increase trust, in the robot, from its users.
Part 3: in the final part of the talk I conclude with some ethical questions. The first is: if we could build an ethical robot, are we ethically compelled to do so? Some argue that we have an ethical duty to try and build moral machines. I agree. But the counter argument, my second ethical question, is are there ethical hazards? Are we opening a kind of ethical Pandora's box, by building robots that might have an implicit claim to rights, or responsibilities. I don't mean that such a robot would ask for rights, but instead that, because it is has some moral agency, then we might think it should be accorded rights. I conclude that we should try and build ethical robots. The benefits I think far outweigh any ethical hazards, which in any event can, I think, be minimised.
*It was not so much an epiphany, as a slow conversion from sceptic to believer. I have long term collaborator Michael Fisher to thank for doggedly arguing with me that it was worth thinking deeply about how to build ethical robots.
Showing posts with label free will. Show all posts
Showing posts with label free will. Show all posts
Wednesday, October 30, 2013
Monday, February 06, 2006
On free will and noisy brains
Consider that humblest of automata: the room thermostat. It has a sensor (temperature) and an actuator (boiler on/off control) and some artificial intelligence, to decide whether to switch the boiler on - if the room is getting cold, or off - if the room is getting too warm. (If the thermostat has hysteresis the 'on' temperature will be different to the 'off' temperature - but that's not important here.)
I said that the theromstat's AI 'decides' whether to switch the boiler on or off, which implies that it has free will. Of course it doesn't, because its artificial intelligence is no more than a simple rule, 'if temperature <> 60 then switch boiler off', for example. So, depending on the temperature, what the thermostat decides is completely determined. With this simple deterministic rule the thermostat can't simply decide to switch the boiler off regardless of the temperature just for the hell of it.
Well all of that is true for 99.99..% of the time. But consider the situation when the temperature is poised on almost exactly the value at which the thermostat switches. The temperature is neither going up nor down but is balanced precariously at a value just a tiny fraction of a degree away from the switching value. Now what determines whether the thermostat will switch? The answer is noise. All electrical systems (actually all physical systems above absolute zero) are noisy. So, at any instant in time the noise will have the effect of adding or subtracting a tiny amount to the temperature value, either pushing it over the switching threshold, or not.
For 99.99..% of the time the thermostat is deterministic, but for the remaining 0.00..1% of the time it is stochastic: it 'decides' whether to switch the boiler on or off at random, i.e. 'just for the hell of it'.
But, I hear you say, that's not free will. It's just like tossing a coin. Well, maybe it is. But maybe that's what free will is.
Consider now that oldest of choices. Fight or flee. Most of the time, for most animals, there is no choice. The decision is easy: the other animal is bigger, so run away; or smaller, so let's fight; or it's bigger but we're trapped in a corner, so fight anyway. Just like the thermostat, most of the time the outcome is determined by the rules and the situation, or the environment.
But occasionally (and probably somewhat more often than in the thermostat case) the choices that present themselves are perfectly evenly balanced. But the animal still has to make a choice and quickly, for the consequences of dithering are clear: dither and most likely be killed. So, how does an animal make a snap decision whether to fight or flee, with perfectly balanced choices? The answer, surely, is that the animal needs to, metaphorically speaking, toss a coin. On these rare occasions its fate is decided stochastically and brains, like thermostats, are noisy. Thus it is, I contend, neural noise that will tip the brain into making a snap decision when all else is equal - the neural equivalent of tossing a coin.
This is why I think brains evolved to be noisy.
The long extinct ditherers probably had less noisy brains.
I said that the theromstat's AI 'decides' whether to switch the boiler on or off, which implies that it has free will. Of course it doesn't, because its artificial intelligence is no more than a simple rule, 'if temperature <> 60 then switch boiler off', for example. So, depending on the temperature, what the thermostat decides is completely determined. With this simple deterministic rule the thermostat can't simply decide to switch the boiler off regardless of the temperature just for the hell of it.
Well all of that is true for 99.99..% of the time. But consider the situation when the temperature is poised on almost exactly the value at which the thermostat switches. The temperature is neither going up nor down but is balanced precariously at a value just a tiny fraction of a degree away from the switching value. Now what determines whether the thermostat will switch? The answer is noise. All electrical systems (actually all physical systems above absolute zero) are noisy. So, at any instant in time the noise will have the effect of adding or subtracting a tiny amount to the temperature value, either pushing it over the switching threshold, or not.
For 99.99..% of the time the thermostat is deterministic, but for the remaining 0.00..1% of the time it is stochastic: it 'decides' whether to switch the boiler on or off at random, i.e. 'just for the hell of it'.
But, I hear you say, that's not free will. It's just like tossing a coin. Well, maybe it is. But maybe that's what free will is.
Consider now that oldest of choices. Fight or flee. Most of the time, for most animals, there is no choice. The decision is easy: the other animal is bigger, so run away; or smaller, so let's fight; or it's bigger but we're trapped in a corner, so fight anyway. Just like the thermostat, most of the time the outcome is determined by the rules and the situation, or the environment.
But occasionally (and probably somewhat more often than in the thermostat case) the choices that present themselves are perfectly evenly balanced. But the animal still has to make a choice and quickly, for the consequences of dithering are clear: dither and most likely be killed. So, how does an animal make a snap decision whether to fight or flee, with perfectly balanced choices? The answer, surely, is that the animal needs to, metaphorically speaking, toss a coin. On these rare occasions its fate is decided stochastically and brains, like thermostats, are noisy. Thus it is, I contend, neural noise that will tip the brain into making a snap decision when all else is equal - the neural equivalent of tossing a coin.
This is why I think brains evolved to be noisy.
The long extinct ditherers probably had less noisy brains.
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